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      This chapter investigates Hugo Grotius’s recognition of the ocean as both a 
visceral and abstract poetic in his   Mare Liberum   ( The Free Sea  ) (1609). It indicates 
how moments of poetic quotation enforce, but at times more forcefully disrupt the 
apparent certainties of Grotius’s reasoning. Suggesting that his frequent gestures 
to works of poetic art from the Roman canon are ﬁ  nally more disjunctive than 
junctive, this close literary critical approach to this famous work of maritime law 
yields anxiety about the motivation and moral coherence of Grotius’s argument. 
Focusing on the inter-textual aesthetics of the legal narrative, this chapter aims to 
understand how the ideas and atmosphere generated by Grotius’s use of literature 
predicts and even exceeds centuries of criticism of   Mare Liberum . 
  While he has long been celebrated as a founding father of secular universal 
human rights discourse, more recent scholarship is tending to focus on Grotius’s 
promotion of a modern international order premised on substantive inequalities 
between states and a politics of violence.    2     And while his prodigious output  —  he 
published over 50 books  —  has long been recognised as learned and sophisticated, 
he has always been criticised as a politically complicit and opportunistic thinker.    3   
Nonetheless, it is hard to overestimate the importance of Grotius’s work to early 
modern debates between European maritime powers, and to the history of trade 
and colonial expansion    4    ; the continuing importance of his theories to moral, polit-
ical and legal philosophy    5    ; and the iconic signiﬁ  cance of his work in debates over 
the law of the sea, and within histories of international law.    6     The authority Grotius 
derives from and lends the Roman legal tradition is crucial to his status across 
these histories and disciplines.    7     His reliance on Roman law in   Mare Liberum   has, 
as Philip Steinberg points out, led to an assumption of the Roman laws of the sea 
as the ﬁ  rst international law, and is part of an inﬂ  uential body of scholarship that 
works upon the larger intellectual and ethical continuities between Roman and 
modern law.    8     Within this tradition, Benjamin Straumann traces the force of 
Grotius’s arguments to Roman legal rhetorical practices of deduction from prin-
ciple, representation of consensus, and testimony. He argues that in bringing the 
Roman conception of rules as rights-based  —  particularly Cicero’s representations 
of a remedial ‘just war’ as an institution of natural law, and his paralleling of state 
and individual rights as intrinsically natural  —  to bear on the fraught relationships 
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1 between states in the early-modern period, Grotius offers ‘a genuinely modern 
approach to natural law’.    9     In developing his argument, Straumann is careful to 
recognise discontinuities between Greek and Roman, and between early modern 
and modern conceptions of rights and the laws of nations.    10     Other scholars work-
ing on Grotius’s use of the Roman jurists are even more wary of ‘the ruinous 
reasoning that compels some writers to suggest that modern doctrines of interna-
tional law can trace their lineage directly back to ancient times’.    11   
  In Ram Anand’s persuasive but not uncontroversial view, referencing the 
Roman jurists enables Grotius to access laws that were generated by South and 
South-East Asian states.    12     He argues that close commercial relations between 
these regions and the Roman Empire operated on the basis of a legal understanding 
of the freedom  —  the unpossessability  —  of Indian Ocean space that was primarily 
generated by the practice of its Eastern littoral states. In Anand’s telling, with the 
collapse of the Roman Empire, this relationship was lost, Europe turned inwards, 
and South and South East Asia turned to trading partners in the Middle East. 
Over the subsequent centuries, a legal culture of   mare clausum  — enclosed  seas —
  became more entrenched in Europe, so the late 16th/early 17th century of 
European maritime commercial adventure found Grotius needing the earlier 
Roman sources to make his argument.    13     In this way, his quotation of Roman 
jurists is central to Anand’s thesis that ‘Whatever may be said about some other 
rules of international law, freedom of the seas, which had formed the pith and 
substance of the modern law of the sea, is one principle which Europe learnt and 
got from Asian state practice through Grotius.’    14   
  As China Miéville recognises, Anand and others offer important correctives to 
Eurocentric narratives of international law.    15     But he also critiques these recupera-
tive histories as tending to offer an ‘arithmetic model’, in which ‘historical change 
occurs through the addition of separate sets of ideas one to the other’. In this 
sense, these histories of extra-European state agency are broadly continuous with 
a long tradition of doctrinaire and schematic international legal historiography in 
which ‘[t]here is no sense of social totality’, and which therefore obscures the 
extent to which ‘international law   is   colonialism’.  16     Within Miéville’s thesis, 
Grotius’s work on the law of the sea is foundational in its emphatically de-historical 
privileging of Roman law and ignoring of the vast shifts in political economy that 
separate Roman from early modern lives, economies and state perspectives. In his 
reading, the appeal of Roman law for Grotius is not that it allows him to access a 
lost history of international legal relations, but rather that it allows him to cun-
ningly work with a tradition grounded in a distinction between   dominium   (posses-
sion) and   imperium   (control) as practiced by the Romans in   Mare Nostrum   (‘our sea’), 
the Mediterranean. Baldly stated, this distinction allows a juridically abstract doc-
trine of free seas and nominally equal states that yet enables a freedom to violently 
exert power.    17   
  Looking to Grotius’s reliance on the Roman jurists raises acute questions 
around his use of the poets. In what ways does the poetic literature contribute to 
or adumbrate his ‘modernisation’ of Roman natural law? How do these quotations 
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1 testify to and how do they detract from Grotius’s acknowledgement of the inter-
national legal standards of Indian Ocean states? Do they lend a sense of ‘real’ 
history, or do they have a de-historicising effect? In what ways do they encourage 
and in what ways cast doubt on the ‘right’ to wage ‘just war’ and/or the ‘imperial 
‘rights’ of the Dutch? While Grotius often quotes the poetry to prove or endorse 
these ‘rights’, his deployment of poetic art also reads as an attempt to reconcile or 
transcend various approaches. It often seems that what appeals to Grotius in the 
work of these writers  —  what he ﬁ  nds most compelling and unique in their art  —  is 
a critical nuance between custom (in literary form or thought) and unique story; 
myth and experience; detached enquiry and immediate emotion; the conceptual 
and the material; the untestable and the empirically known.    18     As such, ﬂ  ourishing 
moments of poetic and dramatic reference are both highly enabling and vulnera-
ble points in Grotius’s methodology. My argument is that these moments some-
times cover-up moral qualms, but that they accrue into a more critical signiﬁ  cation 
of a perplexity about the legitimacy of the legal truths that he so stridently pursues. 
In other words, that moral doubt is admitted through the placement of poetic 
scenes in   Mare Liberum  : scenes that are often drawn from texts which imagine 
fraught encounters between men (and occasionally women) and marine geogra-
phies. Key to this chapter is the apprehension that the apparent vigour of Grotius’s 
  Mare Liberum   is riddled by a troubled relationship between the absolutes of law and 
the effects of art.    19   
 In 1603, a ship of the  Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie  (Dutch East India Company) 
captured a Portuguese trading carrack, the  Santa Catarina , in the Strait of Singapore. 
With the aim of placating company shareholders worried about both the morality 
and costs of such action, Grotius was commissioned to write a justiﬁ  cation of the 
capture as a defence against Portugal’s attempts to monopolise trade in the Indian 
Ocean. His extensive   De rebus Indicis   ( On the Affairs of the Indies  ) or   De iure praedae 
commentarius   ( Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty  ) was completed   circa   1604, but 
not discovered and published until the mid-nineteenth century.    20     It may be that 
the dividend yielded to shareholders from the sale of the breathtaking wealth of 
goods from the   Catarina   overcame the qualms of the shareholders and overtook 
the need for Grotius’s treatise.    21     However, in 1608 the United Provinces of 
the Netherlands entered a new and formal phase of negotiations with Portugal. 
The Portuguese were seeking a guarantee from European competitors to respect, 
as exclusive, their navigational, commercial and political connections with the 
East Indies, India and China. Concerned that their government would acquiesce 
to these demands, the VOC asked Grotius to publish parts of the text originally 
written as a justiﬁ  cation of the capture of the   Catarina  . These parts were restruc-
tured as   Mare Liberum .  22     A reading of some of the continuities and discontinuities 
between   Mare Liberum   and its more expansive source text brings into relief 
Grotius’s debt to the Roman poets, and foreshadows the ambivalence of their 
effect within the later text. 
  In the opening paragraphs of   De iure praedae  , Grotius offers his initial moves 
towards what was to become  —  through   Mare Liberum   and more fully in his most 
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1 famous and major treatise  De iure belli ac pacis  ( On the Laws of War and Peace ) (1625) — a 
foundational description of a modern natural law of human rights. Within this 
nascent argument, Grotius recognises nature as the primary source of law through 
Lucretius’s poem   De Rerum Natura   ( On the Nature of Things  ) (50 BC). Concluding his 
proposal that ‘the truly good man will be free . . . from the disposition to accord 
himself less than his due’, he quotes:    23   
  hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest  
  non radii solis neque lucida tela diei  
  discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque   24   
  This terror of the mind [or soul], then, needs to be scattered, not by the rays 
of the sun nor the bright weapons of the day 
  But by visible nature and by its [inner] law    25     
  Through these lines of poetry, Grotius articulates  —  possibly for the very ﬁ  rst 
time in his known writing  —  an understanding of nature as the ‘sole . . . source’ of 
the laws deﬁ  ning ‘how much is owed to others, and how much to oneself’.    26    But 
the nature to which he appeals is not sole or single. The phrase ‘  naturae species 
ratioque  ’ is repeated at a number of crucial points in   De Rerum Natura  , and its mean-
ing beyond and within the poem has bothered two millennia of readers.    27    What 
seems clear is that it conveys an idea of nature as having an outer aspect (  species ) 
and an inner part (  ratio  ). (The connotation of inner may derive from the contrast 
with   species   and may not be given by the term itself. Or the connotation of inner 
might be what distinguishes   ratio   from the more common word for law,   lex .  28  )  To 
disperse terror  —  which within Grotius’s context, is to achieve something like a 
steelier self-respect more than a freedom from fear connoting consolation or 
peace  —  one needs (in the sense of both a moral and practical imperative) to look 
to both these constituents of nature. One inﬂ  uential gloss on the phrase is that it 
signiﬁ  es a necessary merger of poetic and philosophical approaches, where poetry 
is emotive, reactive, and immediate ( species ) and philosophy is detached and scientiﬁ  c 
(  ratio ).  29     Another persuasive gloss highlights the sense of inextricability (beyond 
simple complementarity) yielded by the phrase. With close reference to surround-
ing lines of poetry,   species   is read as connoting the ‘causal’ ‘regularity of all visible 
phenomena’, so that the ﬁ  nal vision of nature captured by the words is one in 
which ‘the massive sensuous earth . . . becomes a crystalline abstract’.    30    Following 
these scholars and bringing a wide interpretation of Lucretius’s   naturae species 
ratioque   to   De iure praedae   and Grotius’s   oeuvre   more generally, the lines may be read 
to indicate the sense of a necessary commitment to the visceral natural world as a 
poetic   in itself   which both derives from and gives rise to natural law. Grotius may 
be read as turning to Lucretius at the beginning of this early text to deﬁ  ne both an 
entwined sense of nature and his entwining method, which we then see enacted by 
his continual turns to poetry in   De iure praedae   and even more starkly in the more 
compact   Mare Liberum  . Further, that this   natura   is contrasted with   radii solis   and 
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1   lucida tela diei   emphatically grounds both its parts. In other words, the poem posits 
a nature that is not legitimated or shaped by  —  that does not derive inner meaning 
from  —  anything transcending (descending to) the earth. The contrast connoted 
through the use of the term ‘  necessest ’ — literally  ‘it  is  necessary’ — is  highlighted  in 
William Ellery Leonard’s translation of the ﬁ  nal line as ‘But   only   Nature’s aspect 
and her law’ (my emphasis; see note 12). The secular or at least potentially secular 
nature of this exclusive   natura   predicts Grotius’s fame. 
  The status of Grotius’s work is in no small part due to the perception that he 
conceived a natural law that lent a newly secular shape and force to the language 
of freedoms and rights.    31     But whether Grotius’s secularity was new or is truly secu-
lar is a point of continuing discussion, with most of the debate beginning and 
ending with Grotius’s statement in   De iure belli ac pacis   that ‘What we have been 
saying would have a degree of validity even if we should concede that which 
cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that 
the affairs of men are of no concern to [H]im’.    32     However, there does seem to be 
consensus that Grotius’s position  —  whether truly secular or not  —  was politically 
astute, and at least in part driven by a desire to place his argument beyond denom-
inational arguments over scripture. But it is also clear that his ‘relative neglect of 
theology’ derives from a political need to recognise the non-Christian players in 
the maritime trading world of the Malay Archipelago and the Indian Ocean.    33   
  As Anand most emphatically highlights, the argument of   De iure praedae   closely 
relies on a detailed history of the relationships between the various national  —  state 
and commercial  —  actors in Indian Ocean trade.    34     This is offered as the set of facts 
to which legal principle is to be applied, but also as customary proof of universal 
rights to trade, to violently defend that right to trade, and to claim recompense for 
losses incurred by those acts of defence. Beyond the presentation of the Portuguese 
as consistently and deeply iniquitous, what is most striking about these passages  —
  and of greatest importance to their presentation as proof of accepted law  —  is the 
insistence on the agency and rights of local states. So when Grotius’s version of 
Indian Ocean trading history reaches the incidents leading up to the capture of 
the   Catarina,   we are ﬁ  rst told: ‘We come now to the last part of our narrative, 
which has to do with the King of Johore.’    35     In his rendering of events, the VOC 
took the Portuguese carrack in defence of their own right to trade with the King, 
but even more fully in defence of the King’s right to trade with the Dutch.    36   
The alliance with Johore crucially thickens the narrative of rightful defence by 
providing an atmosphere of local state authorization and principled defence to 
what was   prima facie   an act of outright piracy by the VOC.    37    Or — taking  another 
common perspective  —  it provides a secular moral gloss on the fact that Grotius’s 
‘very argument for ‘‘free seas’’ is justiﬁ   cation for an act of violent maritime 
plunder’.  38   
  This detailed historical narrative does not appear in   Mare Liberum  , which was 
distilled from earlier parts of   De iure praedae  . While still keyed around the rights of 
the Dutch to access the Indian Ocean, the later text is projected as a more general 
argument for freedom of trade and navigation. Lifted away from the politics and 
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1 intricacies of the   Catarina   incident, the argument that, while ‘inﬁ  dels’ may be 
‘entangled in grievous sin’, they nonetheless have ‘both publicly and privately 
authority over their own substance and possessions’ has a purer and more abstract 
force in   Mare Liberum .  39     The effects of this are consolidated and sustained through 
poetry. The absence of (even a schematic and biased) detailing of history means 
that the exemplary human moments of   Mare Liberum   are predominantly provided 
by scenes from Roman poetry, which tell even more sordid and signiﬁ  cantly 
more personal stories than are present in Grotius’s rendering of Indian Ocean 
maritime history. This cutting of historical detail makes more exclusive and 
less metaphoric space for the mythic poetic of human pre-history and history that 
Grotius derives from the poets. That   Mare Liberum   is not bound to any over-
determining references to the Bible makes even more space for these inter-textual 
effects. While this scriptural absence might only ambivalently gesture Grotius’s 
secular intent, the ‘replacement’ of potential Biblical quotation with gritty moments 
from the Roman canon more fully suggests a strident secular agenda. In these 
ways, the distillation of   Mare Liberum   from   De iure praedae   allows for the larger and 
looser play of poetry within the text, but also more tightly binds its structure of 
ideas to the different kinds of ‘truths’ yielded by the poetry. That the poetry signiﬁ  es 
an attenuated relationship between the text’s arguments and recent political-
economic history, but at the same time offers a more intimate sense of a material 
relationship between man and sea is a marked tension within the narrative. 
  In continuity with   De iure praedae   and with the foundation of that work in 
Lucretius’s   De Rerum Natura  , the introductory passages of   Mare Liberum   set up the 
physical world as the ﬁ  rst source of legal learning. This is not in contradiction to 
divine law, but in recognition that divine law as laid out in scripture is a form of 
positive law that derives ultimate authority from nature, as created by God. The 
impact of these early statements is less to acknowledge God than to put Him and 
scripture aside. One of the opening paragraphs of the text states: 
  For even that ocean wherewith God hath compassed the Earth is navigable 
on every side round about, and the settled or extraordinary blasts of wind, not 
always blowing from the same quarter, and sometimes from every quarter, do 
they not sufﬁ  ciently signify that nature hath granted a passage from all nations 
unto all? . . . even by the wind she hath mingled nations scattered in regard of 
place and hath so divided all her goods into countries that mortal men must 
needs trafﬁ  c among themselves. This right therefore equally appertaineth to 
all nations, which the most famous lawyers enlarge so far that they deny any 
commonwealth or prince to be wholly able to forbid others to come unto 
their subjects and trade with them. Hence descendeth that most sacred law of 
hospitality; hence complaints: 
  Quod genus hoc hominum? Quaeve hunc tam barbara morem  
  Permittit patria? Hospitio prohibemur harenae  
  [What race of men, and what land is so barbarous as to permit this custom? 
We are debarred the welcome of the beach] 
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1  And 
  . . . litusque rogamus  
  Innocuum et cunctis undamque auramque patentem’  
  [We now crave a harmless landing-place, and air and water free to all].    40     
  The lines are from Book One (lines 539–40) and Book Seven (lines 229–30) of 
  The Aeneid   (29–19 BCE), Vergil’s epic of the Trojans’ voyage to Italy to establish 
the Roman Empire.    41     Grotius’s choice to open   Mare Liberum   with a statement 
on the absolute sanctity of a natural law of hospitality, and to promote the force 
of this law through Vergil’s dramatic scenes, has expansive implications. Both 
quotes are taken from speeches by Ilioneus, the eldest Trojan serving under 
Aeneas, the prophesied founder of the new Empire. The ﬁ  rst is from the speech 
he makes to Dido, Queen of Carthage. On their way to Italy, the Trojans have 
been shipwrecked on the coast of North Africa, and he is complaining against her 
people. She reassures him that their wariness of foreigners is justiﬁ  ed, but that 
‘Phoenicians know the world!’ and so will now behave according to the universal 
laws of hospitality.    42     The second quote is taken from the beginning of Ilioneus’s 
speech to Latinus, in which he reveals that the Trojans have arrived in Italy, not 
as shipwrecked exiles, but seeking hospitality as part of a deliberate pursuit of a 
‘prophetic order’ to found an empire. Ilioneus reassures Latinus that his people 
won’t be ‘shamed’, but warns against ‘scorn[ing]’ his offer of an alliance.    43    Read 
back into their original context, then, Ilioneus’s words exceed a simple statement 
of a law of hospitality deriving from the right to trade. Indeed, in its movement 
from a request for hospitality to an imperial assertion, his speech assumes the 
‘impossibility’ of a ‘law of hospitality’ posited by Jacques Derrida. 
  Having circled the idea that to be a law of hospitality, that law must be uncondi-
tional, Derrida says: ‘For it to be what it “must” be, hospitality must not pay a debt, 
or be governed by duty: it is gracious. . . . This unconditional law of hospitality . . . 
would then be a law without imperative, without order and without duty. A law 
without law . . .’    44     As such, it prescribes its ‘own perversion’.    45     But Derrida pursues 
this reasoning, not to demonstrate the non-existence of the law, but the constant, 
everyday manifestation of the law as an enactment of its own perversion. In always 
entailing an assertion of ownership, the granting of hospitality is always an act of 
limiting the guest, and so fails to be truly hospitable. On the other hand, the 
attempt to grant unconditional hospitality  —  to offer a home without limit, without 
an assertion of property, without an imposition of law  —  must turn the ‘host’ into 
the ‘hostage’ of the guest: and so ‘hospitality’ becomes ‘hostility’.    46    The  ‘without 
law’ stops signifying (or never managed to signify) the grace that exists outside 
compulsion: it becomes the possibility of war.   The Aeneid   bears out Derrida’s thesis.  47   
In the speeches to which Grotius directly gestures, the Trojan can be seen to 
pre-emptively refuse the ‘possible’ hospitality that would also signify Latinus’s 
assertion of ownership of Italy and thereby control over the Trojans (thereby 
failing to be hospitable at all). In edging his speech towards a claim to power and 
property, he undercuts Latinus’s very ability to offer hospitality (and so again this 
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1 law of ‘highest sanctity’ becomes impossible). While   The Aeneid   inevitably ends 
with a triumphant vision of Trojan settlement that also respects Latin heritage, 
this ﬁ  nale doesn’t resolve the problematic of Ilioneus’s speech. This isn’t a purely 
literary point. Placing this deconstructive reading of   The Aeneid   back into the con-
text of Grotius’s thesis, it reveals how closely  —  how, in Derrida’s terms, inelucta-
bly closely —  Grotius’s protection of the law of hospitality is related to his assertion, 
later in   Mare Liberum  , of a right to claim what is claimable if it appears to be unoc-
cupied, uncultivated or inexhaustible, which in turn  —  and with appalling speed  — 
turns into a sense of imperial right. The quotations from Vergil don’t just evidence 
Grotius’s complicity in a larger imperial project, but invokes an atmosphere of 
poetic predestination that exceeds the legal reasoning on rights with a mythic 
sense of right. 
  In the words of van Ittersum, ‘Grotius does not qualify as a democrat or a 
human rights activist’. Pointing beyond his publications to letters and other evi-
dence of his relationship to the VOC, she offers an image of a dedicated company 
man whose ﬁ  nal and life-long aim was ‘to defend the establishment of a Dutch 
empire of trade in the East and West Indies’.    48     Alongside the work of Keene and 
Miéville, this biographical research quietens more celebratory readings of the 
potential of Grotius’s recognition of the rights and powers of non-Christians 
nations, and highlights the distance between Grotius’s driving focus on commer-
cial freedoms, and a version of history and rights that transcends the laws and 
metaphors of European conceptions of property (of cultivation, use, and individ-
ual and state ownership). Strategically championing non-European state practice 
certainly does not make Grotius a champion of subaltern rights. The emphatic 
materiality — ﬁ  rst taken from Lucretius  —  of Grotius’s conception of nature can 
thus be seen to have politically and culturally limiting as well as secular and liber-
ating consequences. This is further borne out in Grotius’s use of   The Aeneid   to 
metaphorically predict Dutch ascendency by invoking a speech that supersedes 
moral interrogation by righteously collapsing the right to material hospitality into 
a right to colonise. But in his use of other poets, Grotius seems almost to acknowl-
edge the moral vulnerability of the legal theory he stridently presents.   49   This doubt 
is revealed in the mythic history informing the thinking laid out in the crucial ﬁ  fth 
chapter of   Mare Liberum . 
  Grotius’s basic argument in Chapter Five of   Mare Liberum   is that by nature, 
nothing is private property. But it is in the nature of certain things  —  land, for 
example  —  to have the capacity to become private property through use and 
occupation. Things may also become public by the same processes of use and 
occupation, meaning they may become the property of the state in right of its 
citizens. But some things in nature cannot by their nature ever be possessed. Most 
importantly and fundamentally, ‘the sea . . . cannot be made proper’.    50    Because 
the sea cannot be contained and the sea cannot be exhausted, it must remain 
common to all. The right to navigation of the sea is thus a natural law emerging 
from physical principles. This is all apparently in line with Lucretius’s   naturae species 
ratioque   and in conﬂ  uence with a Vergilian sense of epic order. We are given a 
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1 vision of history as a movement of epochs, in which the laws of property allowed 
by nature become ever more sophisticated. But what is intriguing and disruptive, 
I think, is that what is presented as a history of legal reﬁ  nement is simultaneously 
comprehended as a history of total and devastating moral decline. Nature may be 
legally malleable in consonance with the growth of ‘civilisation’, but Grotius catches 
himself in a poetic myth of nature as a ﬁ  xed, originary standard of morality. 
  Early in Chapter Five, Grotius refers to a ‘primitive law of nations, which is 
sometimes called Natural Law, and which the poets portray as having existed in a 
Golden Age . . . [in which] there was no particular right. . . . For nature knows no 
sovereigns.’  51     Grotius spends a notable amount of text elaborating this pre-history 
in this central chapter (and this history even more fully permeates   De iure praedae ). 
This discourse is keyed around the work of Seneca, and particularly a quotation 
from   Octavia   ( circa   62 AD).  52   This play tells the story of Nero’s cruel divorce 
and exiling of his wife, prompted by his desire for another woman. In line with 
Seneca’s larger   oeuvre   and fame, the play offers a clear warning against the abuse 
of power: a warning that is also explicitly pursued by Grotius in   De iure praedae , 
  Mare Liberum   and his later texts.    53     (Like Seneca, Grotius approves a strong 
state, but couples this approval with repeated warnings against tyranny and 
decadence.) In   Octavia  , the rule of Nero is presented as a time of excess and 
tyranny. The ‘Seneca’ of the text  —  a truth teller who turns the complaints of 
Octavia and her nurse into universal principles  —  is given a speech which opens 
by acknowledging ‘Mother Nature’ as the ‘great architect/of inﬁ  nite creation’ 
(386–87).  54     The speech then offers a remarkably compressed but vividly material 
outline of the declining ‘ages’ of humanity. Grotius lifts these lines from a description 
of the ﬁ  rst age, long past: 
  . . . pervium cunctis iter,  
  Communis usus omnium rerum fuit   55   
  . . . roads were free for all, 
  And all earth’s goods were common property.    56     
 This  ﬁ  rst age is a time when people were ‘gentle’ and ‘just’. It is followed by an 
era in which a ‘restless breed . . ./drag the sea with nets/For ﬁ  sh that sheltered in 
its lower depths’, who cage, noose and yoke animals, and who plough the land. The 
third generation  —  the ‘base sons’ of this second era  —  ‘spared not to riﬂ  e their own 
mother’s body/For gold, and that dread iron whence ere long/They fashioned 
arms to ﬁ  t their murderous hands/This was the generation that set bounds.’ But it 
is the last era — the contemporary of the play — that is most debased, and deﬁ  ned by 
greed, lust, and lechery. It is ‘wicked’ and ‘blood-polluted’.    57     We could scarcely be 
offered a starker vision of a world history in which the development of a sense of 
property is portrayed as a moral dissolution. This disjuncture between Grotius’s 
systematic legal argument and the moral impetus of the poetry on which he relies 
is even more fully complicated by his use of Ovid’s   Metamorphoses   ( circa   8 AD). 
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1   Following his curiously dense, legally objective, but inter-textually morally and 
emotionally loaded evocation of the ages of man, Grotius goes on to demonstrate 
why some things in nature  —  particularly the sea  —  remain common. While he 
writes of those things that are ‘classed by the jurists . . . common to all mankind’, 
he turns to poetry for an actual list. He takes it from   Metamorphoses  , from Goddess 
Latona’s plea to a mob of peasants who are refusing to let her drink from a pool 
(and who, in vengeance, she turns into frogs): 
  Quid prohibetis aquas? Usus communis aquarum est.  
  Nec solem proprium natura nec aera fecit  
  Nec tenues undas: in publica munera veni   58   
  Why must you stop me drinking? Water belongs to everyone. 
  Nature never intended the sun or the air or the ﬂ  owing streams [possibly 
‘ﬂ  owing water’ with a sense that includes ‘waves’] to be private: I’m simply 
here for my common right [literally ‘I have come for public gifts’]    59     
  In line with the classical tradition, Ovid  —  like Seneca and Lucretius  —  offers his 
stories within the highly explicit schema of man’s decline through epochs. This 
appears in   Metamorphoses   as a preamble in which a Golden Age (when humans 
‘without laws or enforcement’ did what was right) inexorably declines through 
silver and bronze ages towards a ﬁ  nal age of iron, deﬁ  ned by ‘criminal lust for pos-
session’, man ‘presumptuously bobb[ing] in the alien ocean’, and in which ‘[t]he 
land that had been as common to all as the air or the sunlight/was now marked 
out with the boundary lines of the wary surveyor’.    60     However, Ovid’s famously 
lucid and debunking sensibility is evident in the preamble to this preamble. Here 
he describes a pre-history to this pre-history, in which ‘the whole of nature dis-
played but a single/face, which men have called Chaos: a crude/unstructured 
mass, nothing but weight without motion’.    61     He goes on to describe the division 
of the world into its various elemental parts before turning to the ages of men. 
So while Ovid appears to follow tradition in bemoaning man’s growing sense 
of property as a moral decline, his sneaky pre-pre-preamble undercuts and con-
fuses this narrative by insisting on the necessity of divisions and boundaries 
to ward off decline into this archaic, undifferentiated chaos (many of Ovid’s tales 
of metamorphoses involve the comically horrifying reduction of humans into 
parts of the natural world). In being continuous with these foundational divisions, 
the growth of man’s sense of property appears more natural and necessary, 
although Ovid does not give this dynamic moral loading. Ovid’s massive and 
carefully chaotic poem delights in stories of elemental change, in which men, 
women and Gods are constantly skirting a return to a state of undifferentiated 
and mere physicality: Lucretius’s   natura   without   ratio  . So while in one sense it is 
ﬁ   tting that Grotius should turn to Ovid for a list of common resources, the 
presence of   Metamorphoses   in   Mare Liberum   also reads uneasily. It threatens 
Grotius’s legal rigour by highlighting the tenuousness of our individual sense of 
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1 being within a natural law and order. This threat is, naturally, most manifest in 
the freedom of Grotius’s ocean. 
  It is a starting point of classical scholarship that Ovid’s   Metamorphoses   threatens 
the world of tense, hard won, but epic order offered by Vergil. But within 
  The Aeneid  , the ocean has, at times, something like Ovidian effect. As Sarah Ruden 
notes, ‘one of [Vergil’s] favourite words is   ingens   (immense, boundless), often giving 
a sense of surroundings . . . uncontrollably swooping in’.    62     This word commonly 
describes the ocean, and the ocean is often a metaphor for a sensibility of the 
  ingens  . But while it threatens to overwhelm the Trojans in the ﬁ  rst part of the 
poem, Vergil’s ocean is more ﬁ  nally the means by which peoples are connected, 
great empires formed, and fate sealed. The ocean in   Mare Liberum   is narrated 
the other way around. Grotius most immediately and explicitly offers the ocean 
as connective and productive, a means to trade and commerce. But to argue the 
continued and current freedom of this ocean, he draws back to a poetic of the 
ocean as always already an uncontrolled commons that neither can nor should 
ever be made proper. This links the ocean to an Arcadian pre-history. It isn’t just 
legally distinct from land, but within this mythic, it is a material residue of a long 
lost, yearned-for morality. It is a reminder that legal reﬁ  nements have been made 
necessary by moral dissolutions. The ocean isn’t a threat within Grotius’s text 
because it is   ingens   as such, but rather because its boundlessness poetically signiﬁ  es 
a different order of freedom: an order that isn’t driven by a legal freedom to access 
property, but the freedom of a more fervently held commons that precedes divi-
sions (including the division between   dominium   and   imperium  : in Ovid’s Golden 
Age, the exclusion of one is the exclusion of the other). Grotius insists that the sea 
cannot be turned into territory because ‘it cannot be possessed and also because it 
oweth a common use to men’.    63     What is latent in the ﬁ  rst half of this crucial state-
ment, but is brought forth by the poets, is that man also morally ‘oweth’ the sea. 
  One area of quandary over Grotius’s natural law thesis is the ﬁ  ssure between 
what Thomas Maunter and Haakonssen describe as ‘the validity of the content of 
natural law and the obligation to keep natural law’.    64     While Grotius offers sources 
and structures of legal knowledge, he is ambiguous about why or how we are 
impelled to act in accord with that knowledge. He is read as leaving room for 
Thomas Hobbes to develop his inﬂ  uential vision of humanity as impelled by pure 
self-interest to recognise others’ rights and to sometimes give up one’s own rights 
to a strong state: acts of prudent cession that are necessary in order to live well, 
beyond a natural state of disorder. (While Hobbes famously draws on Grotius, the 
contrast between Hobbes’s natural disorder and Grotius’s natural order is famously 
stark.  65    ) But while a language of self-interest as the ‘primary’ law of nature drives 
  De iure praedae   and also dominates many parts of   Mare Liberum  , it is not the only law 
directly given by nature. In opening   Mare Liberum   with ‘that most sacred’ and 
universal law of hospitality, Grotius sets a rhetorical tenor that disallows a vision 
of sociability as only deriving from self-interest, even if  —  as his thesis develops  —  he 
ﬁ  nds himself unable to lend it the same primary legal status as self-interest, and 
even if that law of sociability ultimately slides into imperialism.    66     This point is 
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1 made by the righteous, thirsty, sea-blown lines taken from   The Aeneid  — particularly 
the lines to Dido  —  which more fully institute a law of commons given directly by 
nature, not simply derived from the coolly selﬁ  sh right to trade and commerce.    67   
This is a point that seems to defy legal precision. Grotius needs poetry to gesture 
to this moral hold against rampant self-interest. The most human, dramatic and 
emotive moments of   Mare Liberum   come from Roman poetry, epic and plays, and 
these scenes are mostly keyed around a complaint against a failure to allow 
general access to a commons (the shore or fresh water), or are keyed around a 
wistful evocation of a mythic Arcadian past when all was common (the earth, the 
roads): a time when a hard sense of self-interest was unnecessary. Gathered 
together, Grotius’s uses of the poets may be read as articulating a resistance to a 
Hobbesian resolution to the question of obligation. The poets signify the space 
between Grotius and Hobbes: a space that is ﬁ  lled by a sensibility of the ocean 
as the residue of a non-proprietorial morality that has otherwise been lost. 
Analysing Grotius’s use of poetry does not solve the quandary over obligation; 
concentrating on his use of the poets doesn’t yield a natural law solution that 
transcends Hobbes, or a reading of   Mare Liberum   that doesn’t ultimately require a 
turn to positive law (variously given by divine scripture and a strong state) for the 
provision of the necessary sense of obligation. What it does suggest is a textual  —  if 
not fully personal  —  anxiety that there is a more   ingens   moral freedom expressed by 
the physical and poetic nature of the sea than is accounted by his natural law 
theory.      
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